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Abstract 
Recent studies underline a positive impact of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) and new work 
practices on firms' productivity. In order to obtain productivity gains, firms need to provide workers with sufficient 
incentives and to encourage motivations. Our econometric results, obtained with data at the individual level collected in 
Luxembourg in 2004-2005, indicate that Internet use allows for the creation of an enriching work environment that 
positively influences pure intrinsic motivations of the workers that share the preferences of their firm (insiders). These 
pure intrinsic motivations are crowded in when the firm provides positive incentives, and crowded out when the firm 
resorts to monitoring. Moreover, the results show that the virtualization of contact due to the resort of Internet 
communication instead of face-to-face communication decreases the development of a team spirit between workers. 
But the magnitude of this effect is smaller than the magnitude of the positive link of Internet use with workers' need of 
recognition. Concerning workers who think of themselves not as a part of the firm (outsiders), it appears that offering 
the access to the Internet to those workers does not influence their motivations.
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1. Introduction
The fast diffusion of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) in ﬁrms, allowed
notably by the declining price for its use, favors the productivity of the ﬁrm as underlined by
several works (Greenan and Mairesse, 2000; Licht and Moch, 1999; Lichtenberg, 1995). More-
over, the diffusion of ICT has been combined with workplace reorganizations that involve a
change from a “Tayloristic” work organization, characterized by task specialization, pyramidal
hierarchical structure and centralization of responsibilities, to a “Holistic” organization with
multi-tasking, job rotation, decentralization of decision-making, team work, more ﬂexibility for
the employer and greater communication between workers (Lindbeck and Snower, 2000; Oster-
man, 2000). Recent empirical studies show that ICT combined with workplace reorganization
have positive and signiﬁcant effects on productivity at the ﬁrm level (Bertschek and Kaiser,
2004; Black and Lynch, 2001; Bresnahan et al., 2002; Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2000). How-
ever, the effects of technological and organizational changes at the employee level are largely
neglected. Only few papers show that ICT use furthers information diffusion in networks of
workers and strengthen the productivity of employees (Aral et al., 2007).
Firms need to provide the proper incentives and a motivating work environment to favor
the optimal diffusion of information and knowledge that should in turn result in productivity
gains. In the principal-agent view, the ﬁrm exists for a large part to provide the proper in-
centives to obtain the optimal provision of workers’ effort. This view can be extended with
motivations, largely neglected by the economic literature. These motivations, widely analyzed
by organizational psychologists, can be substitutes of incentives and can consequently affect
effort. Building on Frey (1997), Minkler (2003, 2004) introduced both incentives and motiva-
tions in the analysis of the provision of effort at work. Moreover, Akerlof and Kranton (2005)
formalize the impact of incentives and motivations in workers’ utility to provide effort depen-
ding on their initial motivations (given their identity) so as to align or not their preferences with
those of their employers. So, what are the consequences of ICT use on employees’ motivations,
and how can ICT favor productivity at the employee level?
The principal can invest in incentives in order to induce workers to operate in the interest of
the ﬁrm (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Prendergast, 1999). Incentives are provided to workers
through two options, a negative incentive (monitoring) and a positive incentive (wage bonus,
promotions). To be effective, the monitoring needs to be combined with penalties when it
shows that the work is substandard. The positive incentive option rewards workers for effort
by means of monetary incentives like salary revision or bonus. As workers exert effort not just
to maximize their pay but also to affect future contracts, the ﬁrm can also use promotions by
acting on the career concerns of workers (Fama, 1980; Holmstrom, 1982).
Research on motivations has distinguished two types: intrinsic and extrinsic. Intrinsic mo-
tivations are inﬂuenced by the work itself (Deci, 1971), while extrinsic motivations come from
outside the person through external pressure exerted by colleagues or the employer (Frey and
Jegen, 2001). ‘Pure intrinsic motivations’ come from within the worker in bond with his job.
Workers, who ﬁnd their work interesting, will enjoy it and can consequently choose to do good
work for its own sake. So they are supposed to be intrinsically motivated. As technological
and organizational changes seem to be associated with greater freedom in organizing one’s own
workandindiversifyingtasks(Carolietal.,2001;GreenanandWalkowiak,2005;Lindbeckand
Snower, 1996, 2000), it may increase the interest of the job and consequently boost employee
intrinsic motivation. The crowding theory developed by Frey (1997) and Frey and Jegen (2001)
shows that external interventions, through incentives, can increase or “crowd-in” intrinsic moti-
vations or, quite the opposite, can diminish or “crowd-out” these motivations and beyond affect
the provision of effort. In the ﬁrst case, workers feel that their involvement and competence
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are appreciated by employers (possibilities of promotions). In the second case, agents perceive
that the external intervention, like monitoring, shifts the locus of control from the agent to the
principal. As workers become “pawns”, they respond by reducing what they has control over,
i.e. intrinsic motivation (Deci, 1971; Minkler, 2004).
More than the work ethic embedded in intrinsic motivations, Minkler (2004) introduces
‘moral motivations’ in the debate on workers willingness to work hard. Workers’ choices can
be independent of personal welfare considerations, and commitment or duty can motivate moral
actions without taking into account incentives schemes. The integrity of workers can be a rea-
son for moral actions (Minkler and Miceli, 2004). Integrity confers commitments to moral
principles like honesty or a “don’t lie” principle. According to Bradley (2000) “ICT should
contribute to the deepening and development of true human qualities and provide time for peo-
ple to develop themselves as human beings” (p. 856).
According to Minkler (2004), “workers who care about the views of other workers are
subject to peer pressure” (p. 870). This ‘extrinsic motivation’ most likely appears in ﬁrms
that use proﬁt sharing like in teams, because a low level of effort by a co-worker negatively
affects all other workers’ income or well-being (as shirking requires more effort from others).
More broadly, the pressure exerted by colleagues may occur when workers have a preference
for cooperation and can explain what encourages workers to provide a high level of effort (Rob
and Zemsky, 2002). Kandel and Lazear (1992) identify shame as a possible explanation of this
external impact. This feeling arises when shirkers suffer from letting down their co-workers.
As network technologies contribute to codify tasks, knowledge and to collect information, they
stimulate electronic communications and allow workers to get help more easily from colleagues
when it is needed. Moreover, a member of an organization can easily relay to other members’
information and knowledge concerning substandard work and it can, therefore, increase the
feelings of shame when the effort is not sufﬁcient. But as the use of ICT may reduce face-to-
face interactions and informal contacts (Nie et al., 2002), it can also thwart the creation of team
spirit.
The concept of identity developed by Akerlof and Kranton (2005) embodies the extent to
which workers identify with their ﬁrm and want to achieve its goal. Moreover, a recent issue
of The American Economic Review gives pride of place to “work incentives, motivation, and
identity” in its columns (Akerlof and Kranton, 2008; Besley and Ghatak, 2008; Prendergast,
2008). “Outsiders”, who think of themselves not as a part of the ﬁrm, can be distinguished
from “insiders”, who share the preferences of their employers. Workers are risk averse and
their overall utility is derived from incentives, motivations and identity. Insiders should act in
the ﬁrm’s best interest, so that their ideal effort is in line with the expectations of the ﬁrm, while
conversely outsiders do not want to work in the interest of the ﬁrm.
In this paper, we seek to provide an analysis of the consequences of Internet use on workers’
motivations giventhe incentives provided by theﬁrm. Moreover, we introduceworkers’ identity
in the analysis in order to see how Internet use inﬂuences workers’ motivations depending
on their identity. The originality of the paper is threefold. First, we give some new insights
on workers’ motivations taking into account the recent changes in ﬁrms. Second, this paper
empirically investigates the role of workers’ identity. Third, the paper provides results about
the crowding hypotheses.
We perform our analysis on data from the European Social Survey (ESS) collected in
Luxembourg by the CEPS/INSTEAD1 in 2004-2005. By applying maximum simulated like-
lihood estimation techniques (Cappellari and Jenkins, 2006), we estimate a multivariate probit
1CEPS/INSTEAD:CenterforPopulation, PovertyandPublicPolicyStudies/InternationalNetworksforStudies
in Technology, Environment, Alternatives, Development.
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model that permits to evaluate the effect of Internet use on the probability of workers of being
intrinsically or extrinsically motivated, taking into account the potential correlations between
workers’ motivations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a detailed description of the
dataset and exposes the empirical framework of our analysis. Section 3 discusses the results,
and conclusions are given in the fourth section.
2. Data and methodology
The data used in this study relate to individuals working and living in the Grand Duchy of
Luxembourg. They were collected within the framework of a European project, the European
Social Survey (ESS). This European project was conducted over 20 countries of the European
continent on nationally representative samples of individuals. It contains information on a wide
range of attitudinal and socio-demographic characteristics of individuals. In Luxembourg, an
additional questionnaire was inserted. It provides items on the use of technologies, both at home
and at work. The data were collected during the period 2004-2005 by the CEPS/INSTEAD
thanks to the ﬁnancial support from the Luxembourg National Research Fund (FNR). As we
want to analyze the links between Internet use at work and motivations, we focus our attention
on the working population and more speciﬁcally on employees who are aged between 16 and
65. The numbers of individuals in the sample is 7062.
Concerning motivations, the pure intrinsic one is caught by a proxy of having an enrich-
ing work, the moral one by a proxy deﬁned by the fact of following rules even when no one
is watching3. For the extrinsic motivations we capture external pressure with the use of two
variables, the need of colleagues’ gratitude and a proxy of team spirit.
We jointly estimate the workers’ motivation equations, taking into account their potential
correlations with the following system of equations:
⎧
   ⎨

















where i is for the worker (insider or outsider depending on the sub-sample analyzed in
the regression), βj the parameter of Internet use, γj the vector of parameters that captures the
inﬂuence of the control variables and εji the error terms (with j = 1...,4).
The control variables can be divided in four main groups: (1) incentives: monitoring, wage
bonus, promotions; (2) workplace organization: small team, multi-tasking, ﬂexibility4; (3) in-
dividual characteristics: sex, marital status, age, education level (three groups: 0-13 years at
2In the Appendix we provide descriptive statistics of the data.
3The details of the ESS questions and the variables constructed concerning incentives, motivations and identity
are contained in the Appendix.
4Even if we have no information on ﬁrms’ choice of organization and of the possible organizational changes
implemented in the last years, we can construct variables related to the characteristics of occupied job to capture,
as far as possible, workplace organizational practices. We have information on the diversity of the tasks carried
out in the job to have an idea of employee’s versatility (“Multi-tasking”). The data also give information about
the ﬂexibility of the work schedule, i.e. the fact that the worker is often informed at short notice before having to
work overtime for the needs of the ﬁrm, which gives us an idea of ﬂexibility in the organization of the production
(“Flexibility”). We also include a dummy for “small team” if the worker works with less than 9 persons.
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school, High School Graduate, College Graduate), number of work hours, tenure and occupa-
tion (ﬁve groups: unskilled workers; skilled workers; clerks and services workers; technicians;
professionals and high level management); and (4) ﬁrm characteristics: size, sectors (three
groups: education, civil or health services; industry, construct; trade, transport, ﬁnancial ser-
vices and property business).
The error terms εji are distributed as multivariate normal, each with a mean of zero, and
variance-covariance matrix with the value 1 on leading diagonal and correlations ρkj = ρjk as
off-diagonal elements. When the correlation coefﬁcient is 0 the motivations are independent,
otherwise they are interdependent.
As the dependent variables in each equations are dummies, we use a multivariate probit
model to estimate the equation system with a maximum simulated likelihood estimation tech-
nique (Cappellari and Jenkins, 2006).
Following Akerlof and Kranton (2005), we distinguish two social categories of employees
(insiders and outsiders) by using the degree of loyalty of workers towards their ﬁrm or how
much they are proud to be working for their ﬁrm. Despite the shortcomings of the concept
because “[...] these responses do not tell us why workers feel this way. Perhaps ﬁrms invest in
identity. Perhaps workers select organizations that share their values. Perhaps workers adopt
their ﬁrms’ values to minimize cognitive dissonance” (Akerlof and Kranton (2005), p. 22),
it corresponds to the framework they build where identity is a part of workers’ utility. From
this point of view, we use the following question: “Thinking about the organization you work
for, how much do you agree with the following statement? I would turn down another job
with higher pay in order to stay with this organization”. If the employee agrees or strongly
agrees with the statement, he or she is considered as an insider, otherwise the employee is
considered as an outsider. In our data, nearly 40% of employees can be considered as insiders
(278 individuals) and 60% as outsiders (428 individuals).
3. Estimation results
Following Akerlof and Kranton (2005), we analyze the consequences of Internet use on
workers’ motivations given the incentives provided by the ﬁrm and distinguishing insiders from
outsiders. In order to verify that the motivations are not dependent with the identity of the
worker, we perform Chi-squared tests. The Chi-squared tests presented in Table 1 show that,
except for one of the extrinsic motivation with a test signiﬁcant at 10% (‘need of colleagues’
gratitude’), there is no difference between insiders and outsiders regarding motivations.
Table 1: Chi-squared tests: motivations and identity
Insider Outsider χ2
Pure intrinsic motivations 0.7845 0.7765 ns
(0.41) (0.42)
Moral motivations 0.6644 0.6669 ns
(0.47) (0.47)
Need of colleagues’ gratitude 0.5610 0.6256 *
(0.50) (0.48)
Team spirit 0.8393 0.8090 ns
(0.37) (0.39)
(*) signiﬁcant at 10%; (ns) not signiﬁcant.
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3.1. The case of insiders
Table 2 presents the results of the estimation conducted on the subsample of insiders.
The results highlight the fact that Internet use promotes the diversiﬁcation of work and par-
ticipates in the enrichment of tasks. As shown by Deci (1971) or Minkler (2004), an enriching
work shall promote the positive assessment by employees of their work and, therefore, their
pure intrinsic motivation. Pure intrinsic motivations imply the delivery of the optimal effort
without any ﬁnancial compensation. An employee intrinsically motivated by an enriching work
will obtain a higher utility than an employee not intrinsically motivated and will beyond provide
a higher effort.
Table 2: Multivariate probit on the subsample of insidersa
Pure intrinsic Moral Need of Team
motivations motivations colleagues’ spirit
(1) (2) gratitude (3) (4)
Coeff. Marginal Coeff. Marginal Coeff. Marginal Coeff. Marginal
effect effect effect effect
Internet 0.657** 0.1029 0.310 ns 0.664*** 0.2545 -1.017*** -0.1456
(0.285) (0.237) (0.233) (0.315)
1. Incentives
Monitoring -0.593** -0.1014 0.001 ns -0.005 ns -0.256 ns
(0.235) (0.198) (0.191) (0.247)
Wage bonus 0.786** 0.0957 -0.261 ns -0.050 ns -0.053 ns
(0.323) (0.237) (0.244) (0.282)
Promotions 0.759*** 0.1258 0.466** 0.1628 0.133 ns 0.109 ns
(0.246) (0.215) (0.202) (0.246)
2. Workplace organization
Small team -0.721*** -0.1437 0.227 ns 0.074 ns -0.296 ns
(0.250) (0.234) (0.226) (0.298)
Multi-tasking 1.622*** 0.4416 -0.449 ns 0.164 ns 1.072*** 0.2140
(0.271) (0.282) (0.236) (0.260)
Flexibility 0.300 ns 0.143 ns -0.317 ns -0.494* -0.0702
(0.270) (0.229) (0.229) (0.276)
3. Individual characteristics
Male 0.962*** 0.1928 0.405* 0.1462 -0.116 ns -0.928*** -0.0968
(0.293) (0.236) (0.252) (0.338)
Married 0.080 ns 0.350* 0.1226 0.054 ns 0.551** 0.0689
(0.229) (0.206) (0.194) (0.274)
Age 0.035 ns 0.079 ns -0.124 ns -0.310*** -0.0386
(0.081) (0.072) (0.085) (0.081)
Age squared/100 -0.054 ns -0.092 ns 0.108 ns 0.328*** 0.0408
(0.098) (0.087) (0.100) (0.098)
0-13 years at Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
school
High School -0.302 ns -0.140 ns -0.711*** -0.2777 0.007 ns
Graduate (0.298) (0.277) (0.269) (0.424)
College 0.723 ns -0.026 ns -0.971*** -0.3710 0.704 ns
Graduate (0.514) (0.313) (0.345) (0.566)
# Work -0.024* -0.0039 -0.004 ns 0.007 ns 0.068*** 0.0085
hours (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.015)
Job tenure -0.043 ns 0.061* 0.0216 -0.010 ns -0.021 ns
(0.040) (0.034) (0.033) (0.039)
Job tenure 0.120 ns -0.172* -0.0607 0.018 ns 0.102 ns
squared/100 (0.118) (0.095) (0.096) (0.123)
Professional, high 0.314 ns -1.067*** -0.4007 -0.074 ns 0.786 ns
level management (0.484) (0.412) (0.382) (0.503)
Technicians 0.427 ns -0.957** -0.3539 -0.797** -0.3098 0.922** 0.0880
(0.428) (0.377) (0.341) (0.401)
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Pure intrinsic Moral Need of Team
motivations motivations colleagues’ spirit
(1) (2) gratitude (3) (4)
Coeff. Marginal Coeff. Marginal Coeff. Marginal Coeff. Marginal
effect effect effect effect
Clerks and services -0.535 ns -0.994*** -0.3732 -0.858*** -0.3312 1.576*** 0.1128
workers (0.376) (0.376) (0.322) (0.401)
Skilled workers -1.087*** -0.2741 -0.402 ns -0.715* -0.2783 0.121 ns
(0.419) (0.475) (0.377) (0.424)
Unskilled workers Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
4. Firm characteristics
Less than 10 Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
employees
10-24 employees -1.369*** -0.3446 -0.804** -0.3017 -0.228 ns 0.329 ns
(0.413) (0.312) (0.334) (0.360)
25-99 employees -1.617*** -0.4325 -0.152 ns 0.173 ns 0.105 ns
(0.394) (0.309) (0.302) (0.367)
100-499 -0.287 ns -0.256 ns 0.422 ns -0.097 ns
employees (0.444) (0.313) (0.318) (0.367)
500 employees -1.306*** -0.3298 -0.414 ns -0.121 ns -0.031 ns
and more (0.424) (0.320) (0.308) (0.419)
Trade, transp., ﬁn. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
and property bus.
Education, civil -0.552** -0.0965 0.016 ns -0.462** -0.1812 -0.134 ns
or health services (0.273) (0.251) (0.225) (0.281)
Industry, -0.129 ns -0.310 ns -0.052 ns 0.090 ns
construct (0.359) (0.364) (0.297) (0.363)
Constant 0.802 -0.539 3.704** 4.692***
(1.534) (1.482) (1.587) (1.598)
Observations 278
Log Likelihood -577.6
Correlation rho_12 rho_13 rho_14 rho_23 rho_24 rho_34
coefﬁcients -0.043 0.690*** 0.228 0.216* 0.218 0.158
(0.141) (0.189) (0.151) (0.118) (0.143) (0.125)
a Robust standard errors in parentheses. Weighted estimations. (*) signiﬁcant at 10%; (**) signiﬁcant at 5%;
(***) signiﬁcant at 1%; (ns) not signiﬁcant.
The results also corroborate the crowding hypotheses (Frey, 1997; Frey and Jegen, 2001).
Indeed, the results show that monitoring reduces pure intrinsic motivations, that will decrease
the effort provided by insiders. Conversely, monetary rewards and possibilities of promotion
crowd in pure intrinsic motivations. In the context of skills acquisition via ICT use, the ﬁrm can
recognize the value of these skills and choose to reward workers in order to retain insiders (and
beyond strengthen their pure intrinsic motivations and effort).
Regarding the impact of Internet use on moral motivations, the results do not reveal a sig-
niﬁcant link between Internet use and the “integrity” to do the work in the interest of the ﬁrm.
Concerning extrinsic motivations, the results reveal a positive link between Internet and the
shame feeling generated by the need for recognition, that stimulates workers. But, the results
also highlight a negative correlation between Internet use and the development of a team spirit.
This team spirit can strengthen the feeling of shame recognized by Akerlof and Kranton (2005)
as reducing the value of the agent when he (she) fails to give the effort that is attended by
the employer. Thus, in the context of less face-to face contacts, it appears that team spirit
is less developed (Nie et al., 2002) which can conduct to decrease effort. If we look at the
marginal effects of the Internet variable in the estimates of the extrinsic motivations, it appears
that the positive effect on the need for recognition is higher than the negative one concerning
the development of a team spirit.
The correlation coefﬁcients show that there is a correlation between the pure intrinsic moti-
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vations and the need of colleagues gratitude, and also between moral motivations and the need
of colleagues gratitude. Such correlations are taken into account through the estimate of the
multivariate probit model.
3.2. The case of outsiders
Table 3 presents the results of the estimation conducted on the subsample of outsiders.
Table 3: Multivariate probit on the subsample of outsidersa
Pure intrinsic Moral Need of Team
motivations motivations colleagues’ spirit
(1) (2) gratitude (3) (4)
Coeff. Marginal Coeff. Marginal Coeff. Marginal Coeff. Marginal
effect effect effect effect
Internet 0.030 ns -0.357* -0.1266 -0.151 ns 0.212 ns
(0.236) (0.194) (0.193) (0.197)
1. Incentives
Monitoring -0.005 ns -0.099 ns -0.137 ns 0.087 ns
(0.194) (0.165) (0.165) (0.166)
Wage bonus 0.302 ns 0.180 ns -0.199 ns -0.047 ns
(0.278) (0.190) (0.172) (0.183)
Promotions 0.367* 0.0657 0.256 ns -0.255 ns 0.240 ns
(0.198) (0.163) (0.163) (0.175)
2. Workplace organization
Small team -0.132 ns 0.200 ns -0.271 ns -0.087 ns
(0.200) (0.164) (0.172) (0.177)
Multi-tasking 0.896*** 0.2179 0.298 ns -0.031 ns 0.326* 0.0849
(0.207) (0.194) (0.199) (0.188)
Flexibility 0.528** 0.0883 -0.075 ns 0.345* 0.1265 0.142 ns
(0.228) (0.180) (0.183) (0.181)
3. Individual characteristics
Male -0.021 ns 0.114 ns -0.348* -0.1283 -0.019 ns
(0.240) (0.182) (0.200) (0.195)
Married 0.228 ns -0.014 ns 0.039 ns 0.181 ns
(0.215) (0.166) (0.166) (0.179)
Age -0.062 ns 0.001 ns 0.013 ns -0.162** -0.0389
(0.066) (0.057) (0.054) (0.065)
Age squared 0.056 ns 0.021 ns -0.011 ns 0.180** 0.0430
/100 (0.088) (0.073) (0.069) (0.085)
0-13 years at Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
school
High School 0.494** 0.0794 -0.483** -0.1771 -0.164 ns -0.125 ns
Graduate (0.239) (0.195) (0.206) (0.228)
College 1.128*** 0.1434 -0.317 ns 0.405 ns -0.076 ns
Graduate (0.385) (0.263) (0.268) (0.302)
# Work hours 0.020* 0.0036 0.007 ns 0.013 ns 0.010 ns
(0.011) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Job tenure 0.060* 0.0112 -0.000 ns 0.030 ns -0.003 ns
(0.034) (0.028) (0.027) (0.029)
Job tenure -0.122 ns 0.028 ns -0.126 ns 0.022 ns
squared/100 (0.118) (0.096) (0.087) (0.095)
Professional, high 1.048*** 0.1306 -0.589* -0.2206 -0.591* -0.2296 0.780** 0.1436
level management (0.392) (0.332) (0.313) (0.366)
Technicians 0.536 ns -0.572** -0.2122 -0.442 ns 0.366 ns
(0.333) (0.279) (0.275) (0.290)
Clerks and 0.075 ns -0.606** -0.2253 -0.028 ns 0.174 ns
services workers (0.272) (0.254) (0.238) (0.259)
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Pure intrinsic Moral Need of Team
motivations motivations colleagues’ spirit
(1) (2) gratitude (3) (4)
Coeff. Marginal Coeff. Marginal Coeff. Marginal Coeff. Marginal
effect effect effect effect
Skilled workers 0.210 ns -0.523* -0.1961 -0.069 ns 0.558* 0.1081
(0.292) (0.289) (0.282) (0.299)
Unskilled workers Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
4. Firm characteristics
Less than 10 Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
employees
10-24 employees -0.194 ns 0.103 ns 0.070 ns 0.120 ns
(0.303) (0.255) (0.279) (0.269)
25-99 employees 0.441 ns 0.182 ns -0.223 ns 0.221 ns
(0.323) (0.272) (0.294) (0.274)
100-499 0.290 ns -0.182 ns -0.161 ns -0.124 ns
employees (0.315) (0.257) (0.265) (0.265)
500 employees -0.410 ns -0.106 ns -0.292 ns 0.150 ns
and more (0.309) (0.265) (0.271) (0.257)
Trade, transp., ﬁn. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
and property bus.
Education, civil -0.513** -0.1096 -0.146 ns 0.078 ns 0.093 ns
or health services (0.226) (0.194) (0.194) (0.214)
Industry, 0.004 ns -0.252 ns 0.297 ns 0.077 ns
construct (0.285) (0.226) (0.226) (0.274)
Constant -0.213 0.304 0.162 2.987**
(1.152) (1.123) (1.007) (1.228)
Observations 428
Log Likelihood -1023
Correlation rho_12 rho_13 rho_14 rho_23 rho_24 rho_34
coefﬁcients 0.187 0.011 0.154 0.046 0.213** 0.017
(0.122) (0.114) (0.123) (0.095) (0.103) (0.103)
a Robust standard errors in parentheses. Weighted estimations. (*) signiﬁcant at 10%; (**) signiﬁcant at 5%;
(***) signiﬁcant at 1%; (ns) not signiﬁcant.
The results show that Internet use does not have a link with motivations, except with moral
motivations. The negative effect of Internet on those moral motivations suggests that Internet
enables workers to see external opportunities of work and this way decreases the “integrity” of
working hard in the current job.
While Internet does not permit to motivate outsiders, the main results concerning incen-
tives and workplace organization show that promotions opportunities, multi-tasking or ﬂexibi-
lity constrained by the ﬁrm can favor pure intrinsic motivations. Multi-tasking also strengthens
the development of a team spirit, and ﬂexibility the need of recognition. Concerning other ex-
planatory variables, it appears that male outsiders need less than female outsiders the gratitude
of colleagues. Educated outsiders with managerial responsibilities seem to be more intrinsically
motivated than others.
4. Conclusion
The large diffusion of ICT associated with high performance work practices since the early
1990s has raised concerns about the impact of these changes on productivity. Some recent
studies underline a positive impact of ICT and innovative work practices on individuals’ and
ﬁrms’ productivity. In this context of wide changes, our work is intended to study how the ﬁrm
can play on motivations to obtain a high amount of effort and to get the productivity effects
highlighted in the literature.
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Grounded in the economic literature as well as in works initially developed in organizational
psychology, we seek to evaluate empirically, in this article, the links between Internet use and
motivations given the incentives provided by the ﬁrm. Moreover, we introduce workers’ iden-
tity in the analysis (Akerlof and Kranton, 2005, 2008; Besley and Ghatak, 2008; Prendergast,
2008) in order to see how Internet use inﬂuences workers’ motivations depending on their iden-
tity. We conduct our analysis on a representative sample of individuals working and living in
Luxembourg surveyed in 2004-2005 and we estimate a multivariate probit model that permits to
evaluate the effect of Internet use on the probability of workers of being intrinsically or extrin-
sically motivated, taking into account the potential correlations between workers’ motivations.
The results about Internet use and insiders’ motivations show that, by giving the possibility
to use Internet at the workplace, the ﬁrm creates an enriching work environment that positively
inﬂuences the pure intrinsic motivations of workers. In addition, the use of Internet is posi-
tively correlated with the need of colleagues’ gratitude that can generate shame if the level of
effort is insufﬁcient and should lead to a higher level of employees’ effort. It also appears that
the virtualization of contact due to the resort of Internet communication instead of face-to-face
communication decreases the development of a team spirit between workers. But the magnitude
of this effect is less important than the magnitude of the positive link with the need of recogni-
tion. The results on the subsample of outsiders show that providing the access to the Internet to
those workers does not inﬂuence their motivations, except a negative impact on moral motiva-
tions. As these workers do not think of themselves as a part of the ﬁrm, it seems that Internet
use decreases the “integrity” of working hard in their current job since they can see external job
opportunities in other ﬁrms that match better their values.
Concerning the impacts of incentives on insiders’ motivations, our results are in line with
the crowding literature. Thus, it appears that both negative and positive incentives impact on
the positive assessment of their work. The results reveal a crowd-out effect due to the direct
supervision of workers that can badly inﬂuence the provision of effort. Conversely, positive
incentive mechanisms can, through the crowd-in effect, strengthen pure intrinsic motivations
and the level of effort to work, create and transfer knowledge. For outsiders, it appears that
only the positive incentive of promotion perspective enhances their pure intrinsic motivation.
As the identity of the workers corresponds to their self image, it is not easily observable by
the manager. If the manager’s objective is to foster the intrinsic motivation of all employees,
the promotion system should be preferred. As promotions are related to the recognition of the
work made and to the access of potential enjoyable future tasks, they can motivate all work-
ers. If the manager’s objective is essentially to motivate and retain insiders, wage bonuses are
to be preferred, even if they have no effect on outsiders’ motivations. A fruitful extension of
this research would be to endogeneize the identity of the worker with a longitudinal database.
Recent theoretical articles suggest that ﬁrms can invest in motivational capital in order to trans-
form a worker’s identity from outsider to insider, by changing, for example, the composition of
the team, work environment and develop sponsored activities such as sport teams (Akerlof and
Kranton, 2005, 2008).
Finally, we need to notice that we are conscious of the difﬁculties to disentangle ICT and
innovative work practices in studying what can encourage individuals to work in the interest of
the ﬁrm. For example, it seems that, even if new technologies are put at the service of orga-
nizational strategies, the impact on workers’ motivations is mainly determined simultaneously
by ICT and innovative work practices. A thorough examination of the joint effect of ICT and
organizational changes would require more detailed data concerning the changes implemented
in ﬁrms.
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Appendix
Table 4: Descriptive statisticsa
Insider Outsider
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Internet 0.4373 0.50 0.4282 0.50
Monitoring 0.4511 0.50 0.4222 0.49
Wage bonus 0.2128 0.41 0.2216 0.42
Promotions 0.4990 0.50 0.4113 0.49
Small team 0.2867 0.45 0.3733 0.48
Multi-tasking 0.8126 0.39 0.7712 0.42
Flexibility 0.3346 0.47 0.3330 0.47
Male 0.6591 0.47 0.6166 0.49
Married 0.4848 0.50 0.4989 0.50
Age 37.32 11.02 36.78 10.49
High School graduate 0.2841 0.45 0.2625 0.44
College Graduate 0.2294 0.42 0.2159 0.41
# Work hours 40.47 10.31 40.32 10.51
Job tenure 10.46 9.36 8.54 8.84
Professional, high level management 0.1965 0.40 0.1866 0.39
Technicians 0.2791 0.45 0.2293 0.42
Clerks and services workers 0.2087 0.41 0.2310 0.42
Skilled workers 0.1445 0.35 0.1493 0.36
10-24 employees 0.2156 0.41 0.1781 0.38
25-99 employees 0.2030 0.40 0.2022 0.40
100-499 employees 0.1982 0.40 0.2294 0.42
500 employees and more 0.1998 0.40 0.2334 0.42
Education, civil or health services 0.4150 0.49 0.2709 0.44
Industry, construct 0.2054 0.40 0.2366 0.43
# obs. 278 428
a Weighted statistics.
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Table 5: Construction of the variables: incentives, motivations and identity




“ Thinkingabout theorganization youwork for, how much do you agree
or disagree with the following statements? My work is closely super-
vised. ”





“ Tell me how true each of the following statements is about your cur-
rent job. My wage or salary depends on the amount of effort I put into
my work. ”
Quite true, very true Not at all true, a little
true
Promotions
“ Still thinking about your current job, how much do you agree or dis-
agree with each of the following statements? My opportunities for ad-
vancement are good. ”




Based on the answers to the following questions: At least one of the
positive aspects
No positive aspects
“ Tell me how true each of the following statements is about your cur-
rent job. My job requires that I keep learning new things. ”
Quite true, very true Not at all true, a little
true
“ How much the management at your work allows you to decide how
your own daily work is organized? ”
“I have no inﬂuence”
to “I have complete
control”: 6-10
“I have no inﬂuence”
to “I have complete
control”: 0-5
Moral motivations
“ I will brieﬂy describe some people. Please listen to each description
and tell me how much each person is or is not like you. He believes
that people should do what they’re told. He thinks people should follow
rules at all times, even when no-one is watching ”
Very much like me,
like me
Somewhat like me, a
little like me, not like
me, not like me at all
Extrinsic motivations
Need of colleagues’ gratitude
“ I will brieﬂy describe some people. Please listen to each description
and tell me how much each person is or is not like you. It’s important
to him to show his abilities. He wants people to admire what he does. ”
Very much like me,
like me
Somewhat like me, a
little like me, not like
me, not like me at all
Team spirit
“ Tell me how true each of the following statements is about your cur-
rent job. I can get support and help from my co-workers when needed. ”
Quite true, very true Not at all true, a little
true
Insider/outsider
“ Thinkingabout theorganization youwork for, how much do you agree
or disagree with the following statements? I would turn down another
job with higher pay in order to stay with this organization ”
Agree, agreestrongly Strongly disagree,
disagree, neither
agree nor disagree
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